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Blackstone had a point in identifying crimes as public wrongs and torts
as private wrongs.' Both crimes and torts claim victims, however, the
victims' responses vary according to context. In criminal cases, the victim
responds by hoping that the government will apprehend and successfully
prosecute the offender.2 In tort disputes, the victim responds by demand-
ing compensation.'
It is unclear, however, what constitutes wrongdoing. Defining wrong-
doing as the violation of rights is unhelpful, for that definition only raises
other questions: Who has rights and what is their content? Therefore, to
understand the nature of wrongdoing, we should seek a substantive theo-
ry of wrongdoing-an account of what is wrong and why it is wrong. I
wish to venture a theory of this sort by examining the role of dominance,
or domination, in wrongdoing.
Dominance is not the only form of wrongdoing; it is one type of wrong
that, when properly explicated, illuminates large dimensions of torts and
criminal law. The kind of dominance I have in mind is not class domi-
nance of the sort asserted in the Marxist description of capitalism;' nor is
it akin to the alleged dominance of women by men,5 or blacks by whites.6
These instances of status-dominance are undoubtedly unjust and wrong.
If the dominance exists, then surely those subordinated would wish to
take democratic or even revolutionary measures in response. Yet, the
1 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *5 (asserting that private wrongs in-
fringe upon civil rights and public wrongs breach public duties owed to the entire
community).
2 See id. at *6 (contending that the Crown may indict an aggressor in the case of a
battery because a public wrong harms the community and the Crown must protect the
society from violation of its laws).
3 See id. at *5 (stating that, because private wrongs injure individuals, individuals
must compensate for the wrongs themselves).
4 See KARL MARX, CAPITAL: THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO AND OTHER WRITINGS
322 (Max Eastman ed., Random House 1932) (premising the conflict between capital-
ists and workers on the notion that struggles have occurred between classes through-
out history).
5 See ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY 14 (4th ed. 1989) (asserting that pornog-
raphy promotes male supremacy, violence, and sexual domination over women).
6 See CLAYBORNE CARSON, MALCOLM X: THE FBI FILE 120 (David Gallen ed.,
1991).
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criteria for identifying unjust status-dominance are elusive. It is not clear,
for example, whether differential wealth in society necessarily creates the
unjust dominance of the rich over the poor.
Implicit in the notion of unjust status-dominance is precisely that it is
unjust. Adults undoubtedly dominate children, but most people approve
of this categorical assertion of control over the young.
Unjust dominance based on status, when it occurs, violates the values
of both freedom and equality. The subordinated party is able to realize
fewer preferences for action, and the dominant party, relatively more.
The disparity in options creates a situation of inequality, some having
more opportunities than others. On the grounds of freedom and equality
both, then, dominance is morally objectionable.
Dominance, or domination, also affects the extent of responsibility that
the law attributes to the acting party. For example, the South Carolina
statutory scheme for imposing the death penalty lists as a mitigating fac-
tor in sentencing those convicted of murder: "The defendant acted under
duress or under the domination of another person."7 Dominated parties
bear less responsibility for what they do, even when the external pressure
on their actions falls below the threshold of duress as a legal defense. The
reference to domination in this context reminds me of the common law
"marital coercion defense," so brilliantly explored by Anne Coughlin.'
This defense presumed that a husband dominated his wife, and conse-
quently, a wife was not responsible for ordinary crimes that she commit-
ted in her husband's presence.9
I. THE CORRUPTING EFFECT OF DOMINATION
One line of Neo-Kantian thinking assumes that shared values express
what is really good if the consensus is achieved under conditions of non-
domination.'" Consensus is a sign of truth only when no one claims more
than one vote. Domination of others is a way of expressing one's own
preferences in the votes and actions of others." The corrupting effect of
domination on shared societal values causes Roberto Unger to despair
that "moral agreement is often little more than a testimonial to the allo-
7 S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(b)(5) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
8 Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1, 32 (1994) (contending
that the battered woman syndrome, which is the modern day version of the "marital
coercion doctrine," holds negative implications for women because it defines their
activity as a product of a "mental health disorder").
9 Id. at 31.
10 See ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICs 243 (1975) ("For moral
union to be representative of the species nature, it must arise from conditions of au-
tonomy.").
1 See id. (explaining that dominance corrupts the authority of a shared value sys-
tem).
DOMINATION IN WRONGDOING
cation of power in the group."'" Jirgen Habermas reasons along the
same lines when he grounds the regulative ideal of moral philosophy in
consensus without domination.'3
This ideal has many precursors in the history of philosophy. In one
version or another, philosophers have sought the true person within, the
person who expresses himself essentially, unaffected by any form of dom-
ination. For example, Kant had an image of moral behavior, based purely
on reason, unaffected by the domination of sensual impulses.' 4 Also,
John Locke argued that it was irrational to try to coerce someone to fol-
low the true religion because salvation could only come to those who
acted freely, without external pressure. 5 Economists have adopted the
same model of truly free and informed actors in their models of the per-
fect market.'
6
The assumption underlying this implicit claim about the corrupting ef-
fect of domination is that the undominated self, if allowed to express it-
self, will do the right thing.'7 If freed of corrupting external stimuli, the
self of pure reason will, as Kant saw it, act under the moral law.' 8
It is a short step from these abstract ideals to the notion of fully in-
formed consent in the real world. In criminal, tort, and contract law, we
assume that voluntary consent can legitimate transactions. Informed con-
sent, given freely, expresses the actor's true desires, and for that reason,
we assume that the declaration of consent should change the relevant
legal and moral context of the action.
Unfortunately, fully free and informed consent is a fiction. The notion
that we can act uninfluenced by others hardly conforms to the world as
we know it. We always act in context. The cues of approval and disap-
proval from friends and family invariably affect our actions. Even those
12 Id.
13 See 2 JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 70
(Thomas McCarthy trans., 3d ed. 1987) (contending that "the moral authority of an
existing institution 'stems' from the so-called collective consciousness").
14 See IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS *452-53
(claiming that for man to achieve morality, which is linked to autonomy, he must free
himself from the world of sense).
15 JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 34-35 (William Popple
trans., 2d ed. 1955) (arguing that men should have freedom to choose their religion
because God cannot save people forced into religions in which they do not believe).
16 See C.E. FERGUSON & J.P. GOULD, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 224 (Lloyd G.
Reynolds ed., 4th ed. 1975) (asserting that consumers, producers, and resource own-
ers must have perfect knowledge in order to have perfect competition).
17 See George P. Fletcher, Law and Morality: A Kantian Perspective, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 533, 539 (1987) (stating Kant's theory that to act morally, one must "abstract
oneself from the phenomenal necessity of physical laws and.., subject oneself to the
noumenal prices in a system of perfect competition").
18 See id. (discussing Kant's theory that in order for an individual to act morally,
the individual must have autonomy).
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who think that they reject society's values still stand in a relationship to
those values and thus act by reaction. Further, it is impossible to be om-
niscient about the consequences of our actions. Risks and uncertainties
attend everything we do. Assessing those risks is always a guess. In the
end, the notion of acting freely, without influence, is unattainable.
Even though perfect consent is impossible in the real world, varying
degrees of autonomous consent exist. Knowledge increases autonomy.
The more information the better, provided that the person asked to con-
sent can assimilate the material. For example, prior to a medical opera-
tion, doctors and nurses inform patients of the risks involved, but they
cannot ask patients to spend a week researching the risks in the medical
library before allowing the operation. Another dimension that affects the
autonomy of consent is the subtle way people influence each other in
their interactions. This is the dimension of potential domination.
Of course, there are varying degrees of interpersonal influence or dom-
ination. The problem is determining when acts of influence cross the line
and render consent invalid. For example, consider the inducement of
paying money in return for consent. This inducement does not render an
employment contract suspect because people ordinarily receive money
for their work. But, suppose a police officer offers money to a suspect to
induce him to confess. Undoubtedly, this level of inducement, and even
lesser acts of influence, would render the confession involuntary. Why
should offering money undermine consent in one context and not in an-
other?
In plea bargaining negotiations, there is nothing untoward about a
prosecutor offering a lower charge or sentence in order to convince a
defendant to plead guilty. Yet, the prosecutor could not achieve the same
end by offering a recalcitrant suspect a sum of money in return for a plea.
Further, if a police officer comes to your door in uniform and asks to look
around, he need not advise you of your right to refuse entry. But, if the
officer arrests you, she must read you your Miranda rights before eliciting
a statement admissible as evidence against you. These are very curious
inconsistencies. Sometimes the influence is acceptable and sometimes it
is not. There does not seem to be a precise way of measuring influence
and domination. Nor is there a criterion for deciding when domination
invalidates a seemingly voluntary response.
The ideal of free and informed consent expresses Isaiah Berlin's con-
ception of "negative liberty."' 9 It is the liberty that springs from being
left alone, from not being subject to the domination or coercion of
others.20 Positive liberty, which Berlin railed against as the invention of
dictators, holds that people act freely only when they are doing the right
19 ISAIAH BERLIN, FoUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 122 (1969) (describing "negative
freedom" as freedom to act unobstructed by others).
20 Id.
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thing.21 The prime example of positive liberty is Kant's notion of the
moral law.22 Only when legislating the moral law and subjecting oneself
to it, is the individual autonomous and free.23
Accepting the notion of positive liberty-based upon doing the right
thing-would seem to be consent, at least so far as consent implies that
individuals may choose to realize their private preferences. But this is
not necessarily true. Our evaluation of conduct at stake sometimes influ-
ences our assessments of whether it was freely chosen. A good example
presents itself in the Jewish tradition. A man must voluntarily grant a
divorce to his wife.24 If he refuses to execute a rabbinical decision order-
ing him to grant the divorce and the rabbis find that his conduct is unrea-
sonable, they may apply coercive means, such as detaining him until he
consents.25 The justification for forcing him to consent is that though it is
right that there be a divorce, the rabbis do not have the power to circum-
vent his power to say yes or no.26
There are also many cases in political life when we accept implicit dom-
ination in the name of a good cause. For example, General MacArthur
and his American staff exercised considerable influence over the Japa-
nese transition to democracy after the Second World War. The same is
true of the Allies' influence over the Germans in the wake of the Third
Reich,28 or the North's sway over the South in the period after the Amer-
ican Civil War.29 As between victor and vanquished, some degree of
domination is inevitable. Yet, it would be difficult to say that Japan and
Germany did not consent to their new mode of democratic government
or that the South did not consent to the Fourteenth Amendment and the
new national order created by the Civil War."° At times, the right result
warrants compromise in the process leading to decision.
21 Id. at 131 (defining "positive freedom" as one's wish to have freedom to control
one's own life).
22 See KANT, supra note 14, at *447 (explaining that autonomous choices achieve
the moral law).
23 Id. at *450 (asserting that "freedom and self-legislation of the will are both au-
tonomy and thus are reciprocal concepts").
24 See IRWIN H. HAUT, DIVORCE IN JEWISH LAW AND LIFE 20-25 (1983).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 See ROBERT LECKIE, THE WARS OF AMERICA 844 (3d ed. 1992) (arguing that
due to General MacArthur's skill, the United States helped transform Japan into a
self-sufficient democracy).
28 See 9 HENRY FRIEDLANDER, THE NAZI HOLOCAUST 665 (Michael R. Marrus
ed. 1989) (discussing how the Allies replaced the government of the Nazi state with
military rule after Germany surrendered).
29 See LECKIE, supra note 27, at 529 (recounting after the war, Congress supervised
the South by dividing it into five military districts, commanded by federal generals, in
order to ensure that it met its post-war obligations).
30 See MELVIN I. UROFSKY, A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
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These examples of Jewish divorce and political restructuring after a war
illustrate the way domination may enter into a choice that is regarded as
voluntary. In real life, domination is sometimes good, and sometimes
bad. In the abstract, Kant could pose the ideal of withdrawing from ex-
ternal stimuli; but in the real world, we have to accommodate external
stimuli by sorting them into those that properly influence us and those
that should not.
II. DOMINATION IN CRIMINAL LAW
The wrong in domination is that it prevents individuals from acting in
harmony with their true selves. This is harmful only when there is no
good reason for suppressing the true self for the sake of some other out-
come. A good example of this harm, in criminal law, is the wrong implicit
in blackmail. As I have argued elsewhere,3 ' we can understand the essen-
tial wrong in blackmail by comparing two hypothetical cases, the "polit-
ical embarrassment" and "paid silence" cases.
These two scenarios are variations of an incident that reportedly oc-
curred during the 1989 New York mayoralty election.32 David Dinkins
allegedly paid $9,500 to a group headed by Sonny Carson, as the opposi-
tion campaign manager Roger Ailes charged, as "a pay off for.., keeping
him [Carson] quiet until after the election.
33
The common element in these cases is that V, a black political candi-
date, finds the support of D, a black activist with strong anti-white views,
an embarrassment in his campaign. In the "paid silence" variation, V
goes to D and offers him $20,000 to "lay low" until after the next election.
Most people assume that in this variation, namely, in the "paid silence
case," there is nothing criminal afoot. But, if the facts vary slightly; if
Carson goes to Dinkins and insists on a payment to "lie low," that de-
mand, most legally trained people seem to think, would be criminal
blackmail.
There are two distinct senses in which the themes of dominance and
subordination enter into our intuitions in distinguishing the "paid silence"
from the "political embarrassment" case. First, think of these two cases
as posing variations on the dominance gained by either David Dinkins or
Sonny Carson. If Dinkins submits to Carson's demand and pays Carson
OF THE UNITED STATES 443-45 (1988) (discussing the congressional plan for recon-
struction after the Civil War).
31 See generally George P. Fletcher, Blackmail: The Paradigmatic Crime, 141 U.
PA. L. REV. 1617 (1993).
32 Howard Kurtz, With Ailes's Aid, Convict Becomes 'Willie Horton' of N.Y Cam-
paign, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 1989, at A14 (reporting the allegations of David
Dinkins's possible payment to Sonny Carson for remaining quiet until after the elec-
tion).
33 Id. (reporting that Roger Ailes "pounced on recent disclosures that Dinkins's
campaign paid $9,500 in 'walking around money' to a group headed by Carson").
DOMINATION IN WRONGDOING
to keep quiet, Carson gains control of Dinkins and would probably con-
tinue to make demands. On the other hand, in the "paid silence" situa-
tion, Dinkins takes the initiative because he seeks out Carson and offers
him money to stay out of sight until after the election. Dinkins becomes
the master of the transaction. He certainly is not being blackmailed, and
neither is Carson, who is simply being paid a salary for remaining quiet
for a certain period of time. If our fictional Dinkins is smart, he will
structure the payment in the "paid silence" case in staggered installments
so that Carson has an incentive to keep quiet. Of course, Carson may
catch on that there is more money to be had by selling his silence; but if
he starts threatening Dinkins that he will speak should he not receive
more money, the situation reverts to the pattern of the "political embar-
rassment" case.
Becoming dominant in a transaction could hardly be a wrong sufficient
to justify the state's intervening with a criminal sanction. But as a result
of the transaction, another critical feature of blackmail comes into play.
The blackmailer establishes an ongoing state of dominance over the vic-
tim. Once bitten, the prey is defenseless.' The blackmailer may return
and double his demands the next day. This aftermath of potential domi-
nation and subordination is the evil that the crime of blackmail is
designed to prevent.
The thesis of domination as wrongdoing extends to other crimes of vio-
lence and even to theft and embezzlement. Rape victims have good rea-
son to fear that the rapist will return, particularly if the rape occurred at
home or the rapist otherwise knows the victim's address. Burglars and
robbers pose the same threat. Becoming a victim of violence beyond the
law means that what we all fear becomes a personal reality; exposure and
vulnerability take hold and they continue until the offender is apprehend-
ed. It would be difficult to maintain that all crimes are characterized by
this feature of dominance. For example, homicide poses special problems
because ongoing domination over the deceased is conceptually impossi-
ble. The most we can say is that a relationship of power and domination
lies at the core of criminal law. It is characteristic of the system as a
whole.
The way to counteract the power of the criminal over the victim is for
the state to intervene and assert its power over the criminal.3 It is not
enough to make offenders pay damages or a fine, for all this means is that
they purchase a privilege to transgress the prohibitions that apply to
others. The state must dominate the criminal's freedom in order to pre-
34 This is true only regarding typical transactions. Undoubtedly, cases exist that
illustrate demands that people can never repeat.
35 See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN
CRIMINAL TRIALS 6 (1995) (arguing that "[clonvicting and punishing the guilty is our
[society's] way of expressing solidarity with those who have fallen prey to the perva-
sive violence of American life").
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vent the criminal from continuing domination of the victim. The depriva-
tion of liberty and the stigmatization of the offense and the offender pro-
vide the means to counteract the criminal's dominance by reducing his
capacity to exercise power and by symbolically lowering his status.
36
This analysis, then, is an account of retributive punishment that brings
the element of dominance to the fore. It is a way of looking at punish-
ment that enables us to see how the sanction expresses solidarity with the
victim and restores the relationship of equality that antedated the
crime.37 To appreciate the psychological significance of the state's stand-
ing by the victim is to think about the cases in which the state refuses to
prosecute and thereby abandons the victim in solitary suffering. During
the terror in Argentina that led to approximately 9000 "desparecidos"
prior to 1983, many victims' families realized, to their horror, that they
could not turn to the police for protection.3 8 The police were often the
ones engaged in the roundup of suspected terrorists. In the understand-
ing of the victims' families, the failure of the state to come to the aid of
victims implied official complicity in the criminal dominance over the vic-
tims, their families, and other citizens.
The suggestion is that by failing to intervene to counteract the domi-
nance achieved by a criminal, the state and society become complicitous
in the crime. Immanuel Kant had this point in mind when he posed the
famous and oft-derided thought-experiment of an island society about to
disband.39 What should the governing authorities do about imprisoned
murderers? Should they carry out the executions, even if no good could
possibly follow from the hangings? Kant insisted on the executions "so
that each has done to him what his deeds deserve and blood guilt does
not cling to the people."4
The notion of a society's disbanding should be treated as a hypothetical
event, very much like the idea of a society's coming together in a social
contract. Neither of these events ever occurred in history, but they are
useful constructs for testing our intuitions about the conditions of a just
social order. Further, the biblical reference to "blood guilt" supports the
interpretation I have suggested. The view in biblical culture, apparently,
was that a murderer acquired control over the victim's blood, and thus,
36 See id. at 203 ("Punishment counteracts domination by reducing the criminal to
the position of the victim.").
37 Restoration of the relationship of equality is not obvious in a culture that has
become accustomed to thinking of punishment as a utilitarian instrument of crime
control.
8 See Cesar A. Chelala, Argentine 'Amnesty', N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1983, at A15
(reporting that human rights organizations claim that the terror in Argentina, after
1976, is the "most systematic and widespread abuse of human rights Argentina has
known in this century").
39 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS *333 (1797).
40 Id.
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had to be executed in order to release the blood. Once released, the
blood could return to God as in the case of a natural death.4' The failure
to execute the murderer meant that the rest of society, charged with this
function, became responsible for preventing the release of the victim's
blood. This is the meaning of Kant's argument that "blood guilt [should]
not cling to the people."
' 2
Whatever the metaphysics of gaining and releasing control of blood,
the biblical idea should be understood today as a metaphor for society's
complicity in the crime due to its failure to punish the criminal after the
crime. Once the institution of punishment becomes the conventional re-
sponse to crime, the state's decision either to prosecute or not to prose-
cute an obvious crime carries social meaning. The state's intervention
communicates condemnation of the crime and solidarity with the victim.
By prosecuting, the state officials say to the victim and his or her family:
"You are not alone. We stand with you, against the criminal."
Refusing to prosecute and convict for an obvious crime also carries
meaning. The failure of police, prosecutors, and juries to invoke their
established power, their standing by which there is an opportunity to act,
provides the foundation for the perception of shared responsibility. If
they willfully refuse to invoke the traditional response to crime, they in
effect disassociate themselves from the victim. Abandoned, left alone,
the victim and the victim's community readily feel betrayed by the sys-
tem.
Juries also communicate this message when they fail to convict in the
face of obvious crimes. When the state court jury acquitted the four of-
ficers charged with beating Rodney King, Jr., they communicated implicit
approval of the police behavior, thus engendering rage among African-
Americans in Los Angeles.43 The anguish of those who identified with
Rodney King, Jr. resembled the sense of abandonment that the families
of the "desparecidos" felt in Argentina.
The themes of dominance and subordination generate new insights into
the meaning of crime and the point of punishment. It can lead, as it has
in my own thinking, to a renewed emphasis on the place of victims in the
system of criminal justice. It also can lead, as we now explore, to a better
understanding of the structure of tort law.
III. DOMINANCE IN TORT THEORY
The starting place for understanding the difference between the two
41 See DAVID DAUBE, STUDIES IN BIBLICAL LAW 122-23 (1947).
42 See KANT, supra note 39, at *333.
13 I am speaking of the popular understanding of the verdict. As a technical mat-
ter, of course, the jury in State v. Powell only concluded that they had reasonable
doubt concerning the issue of excessive police force. See FLETCHER, supra note 35, at
1 (discussing the anger that African-Americans experienced as a result of the verdict
in the Rodney King case).
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types of "wrongs"-private and public-is to think about the place of the
victim in the analysis of liability. The injured party's contributory fault
plays an important part in the structure of tort liability. But in criminal
law, the victim's negligence or foolhardiness is irrelevant to liability. If
the victim is mugged while jogging at night in Manhattan's Central Park,
the defendant could hardly defend by claiming that "she assumed the
risk." It was irrelevant in the trial of Bernhard Goetz, that when he en-
tered the subway car, on that fateful day, he chose to sit next to the four
"boisterous" youths who would later ask him for money." The irrele-
vance of the victim's fault cuts across the criminal law. Pickpockets can-
not interpose that their victims should have kept a closer eye on their
wallets. Even in cases of criminal negligence, the defendant cannot de-
fend on the basis of the victim's contributory fault. The role of the victim
in precipitating crimes has engaged the interest of sociologists, but the
phenomenon has no bearing on the proper analysis of criminal liability.
The question is: Why?
The answer is precisely that criminal aggression is an act of dominance.
The violation of the victim's rights subordinates the victim to the crimi-
nal's will. The criminal law shields victims against their own imprudence.
They are entitled to move in the world at large with as much freedom as
they enjoy behind locked doors. They can walk in the park when they
want, sit where they want in the subway, and wear skimpy clothes without
fearing that they will be faulted for precipitating rape. This is what it
means to be a free person, and the criminal law protects this freedom by
not censuring those who expose themselves, perhaps with less than due
care, to risks of criminal aggression. The blame properly attaches to the
mugger, thief, and rapist, regardless of the victim's role in the interaction
leading to the crime.
What, one might ask, would be an alternative conception of the inter-
action between injurer and victim? Think about a typical tort case. De-
fendant swings a stick in an effort to break up a dog fight. The dogs move
around, the defendant and plaintiff move with them. Eventually the stick
hits the plaintiff in the eye. Now we could focus narrowly on this interac-
tion and see it just as an act of aggression and dominance. Defendant's
swing injures the passive plaintiff. But we also could see the interaction
as a failure of the parties, taken together, to prevent the injury. An alter-
native paradigm of "failed collaboration" treats the injurer and the victim
as jointly responsible for the minimization of harm. When the stick
makes contact with the eye, it turns out that the bearer of the eye, as well
as the bearer of the stick, may be seen as the causally dominant party.
There are two ways, then, that we may conceptualize a routine injury
from A hitting B. According to the paradigm of dominance, A asserts
44 People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 43 (N.Y. 1986) (holding that the prosecutor's
charge to the Grand Jury about an objective element in the defense of justification
was proper).
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himself by hitting passive B and thus subjecting B to his will. According
to the paradigm of failed collaboration, it takes two for a hit to occur:
Both B and A contribute to the harm by failing to avert the harmful con-
tact. The critical difference is whether we perceive the victim as a respon-
sible participant in the genesis of the injury. That perception, in turn,
depends on whether we see the two parties as engaged in a collaborative
effort to minimize the potential harm occurring in their interactions.
The striking feature of contract jurisprudence-at least from the per-
spective of criminal law-is that the victim of a contract breach is under a
duty to mitigate damages. If the seller breaches the contract by failing to
deliver the goods, the buyer must go into the market and try to cover by
buying the goods from another source.45 Thus, if the market price at the
time of the breach equals the price stipulated in the contract, there are no
damages.4" This elementary doctrine of contract law expresses a radically
different way of conceptualizing the relationship between injurer and vic-
tim. They are engaged in a collaborative scheme for their mutual welfare,
and the breakdown of the scheme imposes burdens on the victim to mini-
mize the damage. The victim of a contract breach bears no resemblance,
then, to the victim of a mugging in Central Park. The former, but not the
latter, is under a duty to take measures to avoid injury. This duty follows
from the principle that the parties must act together to minimize the loss.
There is no comparable duty under the paradigm of dominance.
The example of the defendant's stick hitting the plaintiff's eye derives
from the pivotal 1850 case of Brown v. Kendall.7 This famous decision
by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Council should be understood as
recasting the writ of trespass to fit the paradigm of failed collaboration.48
The traditional conception of trespass that guided the trial court limited
the inquiry to whether the defendant's stick directly caused the injury.
The court asserted that if the impact was direct, the plaintiff's causal con-
tribution to the injury was irrelevant.49 All that mattered was the defend-
ant directly encroaching upon the plaintiff's physical autonomy. The
45 U.C.C. § 2-712(1) (1991) (dictating that in order for a buyer to recover damages
for a seller's failure to deliver goods under the terms of their contract, the buyer must
" 'cover' by making in good faith and without unreasonable delay any reasonable
purchase of or contract to purchase goods in substitution for those due").
46 Id. § 2-713(1) (measuring damages for seller's non-delivery essentially by "the
difference between the market price at the time when the buyer learned of the breach
and the contract price").
47 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
48 Id. at 296 (asserting that the trial court should have given the jury defendant's
instruction stating that "if both plaintiff and defendant ... were using ordinary care,
or if at that time the defendant was using ordinary care, and the plaintiff was not, or if
at that time, both the plaintiff and defendant were not using ordinary care, then the
plaintiff could not recover").
41 Id. at 295 (remarking that judges found trespass to exist when one received inju-
ry from the acts of another).
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principle was that if the defendant dominated the body of the plaintiff by
direct causation, justice required compensation of the resulting injuries.50
The conventional reading of the high court's ruling in Brown v. Kendall
emphasizes a shift from a traditional strict liability standard for trespass
to a fault standard requiring the plaintiff to exercise due care, with the
burden on the plaintiff to prove the defendant's fault.5 ' More significant-
ly, however, the case reshapes the law of aggressive injuries by making
the plaintiff's contributory negligence a complete defense, thus signaling
a paradigmatic shift from trespassory dominance to a private law stan-
dard of failed collaboration.52 As the contract obligee must mitigate
damages, the tort plaintiff must, after Brown, mitigate the risk of injury
by exercising due care. The failure to exercise due care implies a breach
of duty so serious that under the rule of contributory negligence, the
plaintiff forfeits the entire recovery, and under the rule of comparative
fault, only a portion of the recovery corresponding to the relative degree
of the two parties' fault.
One might say that in general terms, the paradigm of dominance is a
characteristic of the criminal law and the paradigm of failed collabora-
tion, a feature of private law, of torts as well as contracts. Yet the basic
principle of criminal law-the wrong of dominating another's physical
well-being-survives and flourishes in the law of torts. It accounts for the
body of intentional torts, which treats the victim with almost as much
concern as one finds in criminal law. The primary difference between
torts and criminal law is that the assumption of risk can be a defense of
varying impact in tort cases;53 whereas in criminal cases of violent aggres-
sion, the victim's knowing and voluntary exposure to the risk is no de-
fense.54
In many tort cases, however, the law does not interfere to prevent
domination until after the injury occurs. In cases of abnormally danger-
ous activities-e.g., blasting, crop-dusting, fumigating, or flying an air-
plane overhead-the defendant directs a disproportionately great risk to-
ward the plaintiff.5 The defendant dominates the plaintiff by the
imposition of risk and the law refuses to intervene prior to the occurrence
of damage. Because the activity is regarded as socially beneficial, it is not
50 Id.
51 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 29, at 163 (5th ed. 1984) (explaining that Brown has become the leading case).
52 Id.
53 Id. at 480 (explaining that courts use "assumption of the risk" in many different
types of tort cases).
54 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (explain-
ing that defendants can rape prostitutes even if the prostitutes put themselves in dan-
gerous situations as long as they do not consent).
55 See generally KEETON, supra note 51, § 78, at 548-54 (tracing the development
of American law pertaining to dangerous activities).
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subject to an injunction and the plaintiff may not interpose defensive
force to protect his physical space. The subordinated plaintiff can do
nothing except wait until the injury occurs and then sue for compensa-
tion.
This subordinated position is exemplified by the passivity enforced
against the dock owner victim in Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation
Co.5 The court held that the dock owner may not close off his dock to a
ship caught in an unexpected storm, rather he may do nothing except wait
until the dock is damaged.57 He has no option but to receive compensa-
tion after the deed. In all of these cases, the guiding principle of justice is
that if the injurer dominates another by the imposition of a risk that is
beneficial to society as a whole, the injurer must make whole those who
fall victim to the activity.
This, then, is the proper understanding of tort law as a mixture of crimi-
nal law and private law principles. When courts impose strict liability, we
see a reflection of criminal law ideas of dominance. The influence begins
early in the law of torts under the writ of trespass and carries forward into
the various situations in which we perceive the defendant's action as ag-
gression dominating the interests of the plaintiff. In contrast, the influ-
ence of private law thinking breaks through in the collaborative principle
underlying the law of negligence. By entering into certain spheres of risk-
taking, the plaintiff and defendant both come under duties to act with a
view to the costs and benefits of their actions. They become a unit acting
under an implicit obligation to optimize the consequences of their ac-
tions.
The problem that remains unanswered is when each of these two ap-
proaches in tort liability should prevail. When should we think in the
victim-protective style of criminal law? When should we think in the col-
laborative paradigm of contract law?
Alas, this sketch is but the beginning of an adequate theory. We can
find some guidance in the notion of a plaintiff entering into certain spher-
es of risk. Consider the tripartite liability relations of airplane owners
and operators. As to passengers in the airplane as well as passengers and
owners of others planes sharing the airlanes, the owners and operators
are liable under the rule of negligence. As to persons and property own-
ers on the ground, the owners and operators of airplanes putting them at
risk fall under the rule of strict liability for ground damage.
These rules make good sense. Passengers enter into a sphere of risk by
voluntary contracting for passage. Those who fly the neighboring airlanes
also enter into the sphere by imposing reciprocal risks on the defendant.5"
56 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910).
57 Id. (holding that a master may maintain a vessel's moorings to a dock in bad
weather, but the dock owner may recover damages from the ship owner if the vessel
injures the dock).
58 Cf. George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV.
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However, homeowners in the path of the flight do nothing to subject
themselves to the risk of airplanes crashing into their living rooms.
The following objection lies at the ready: Because pedestrians enter
into the sphere of risk by walking near the highway (and thus are protect-
ed only by the rule of negligence), homeowners must enter into the com-
munity of risk defined by airplane overflights if they buy their homes with
full knowledge of the overflights (or if they refuse to move once they
learn of them). Admittedly, the distinction between pedestrians relative
to cars and homeowners relative to airplanes lies at the foundation of
current legal practice. The distinction bears some intuitive plausibility
based on the likelihood of an accident. But the border between the two
paradigms is open to dispute, and it would not be shocking if car acci-
dents with pedestrians were treated like airplane-caused ground damage
or vice versa. The principle remains sound even if there may be debate at
the fringes of its application.
CONCLUSION
It turns out that the theory of domination illuminates more than the
problem of undue influence in contract negotiations. It is no surprise that
if one party dominates another, the latter hardly expresses his or her own
true self in consenting to an agreement. Yet, the wrong of dominating
another has also left its imprint on the structure of criminal and tort law.
Violent crimes are acts of domination, and one way of understanding
punishment is to view the violent intervention by the state as the only
available means of correcting the aggressor's dominant position over the
victim. Tort law also embodies the wrong of domination so far as some of
its strains recognize the right of the victim to remain passive in the face of
danger. Therefore, when an aggressor injures a plaintiff, the aggressor
achieves a dominance over the victim that the law may correct as both a
crime and a tort.
537, 548 (1972) (stressing the unity of fault and strict liability under the paradigm of
non-reciprocal risk-taking). Although here I elicit the difference between the two, I
do not mean to depart from the basic contours of my earlier argument. I offer instead
another view.
